IVIE working papers o®er in advance the results of economic research under way in order to encourage a discussion process before sending them to scienti¯c journals for their¯nal publication. 
INTRODUCTION
In the literature, decision-making procedures are often modeled as simple games by assigning worth 1 to coalitions with the capacity of passing a decision and 0 to the others. In this framework, measures have been developed in order to assess the a priori distribution of power among the players, that is, their capacity to in°uence the outcome of a vote. The two best known power indices are the Shapley-Shubik (1954) index and the Banzhaf (1965) index. Both indices can be interpreted either as a measure axiomatically grounded or as a probability. In the¯rst approach, each power index is interpreted as the unique measure embodying a set of properties that characterize it. Since Dubey's (1975) ¯rst axiomatization of the Shapley-Shubik index on the domain of simple games and that of Dubey and Shapley (1979) of the Banzhaf index, several axiomatization have been proposed in the literature. However, most axiomatizations of these indices pay little attention to the compellingness or even to the meaning of the axioms in terms of the voting situations underlying simple games. Alternatively, in the second approach, the value of both indices for a player in a game is interpreted as the a priori probability of that player being a swinger in the coalition passing a decision that is made according to the voting rules modeled by that game. Either index, as any semivalue (Weber (1988) , Einy (1987) ), emerges then from di®erent probabilistic assumptions about this coalition (see also Stra±n (1977) ). In fact, the axiomatic and the probabilistic approaches are complementary interpretations that do not¯t clearly with each other, as pointed out by Blair and McLean (1990) , who propose an axiomatic foundation for the probabilistic approach.
In this paper we consider a third interpretation, that was proposed by Roth (1977b, out that all our axioms in (1999) admit a direct translation into Roth's setting. As a result an axiomatization in this setting emerges in which our axioms acquire a clear interpretation in terms of attitudes toward risk involving roles in collective decision procedures. In particular, several alternatives to Roth's "neutrality to ordinary risk", a direct translation of Dubey's (1975) "transfer", are provided. While his obscure "neutrality/aversion to strategic risk" that di®erentiates either index is replaced by an illuminating interpretation of "e±ciency", up to now missing in this set up, as well as of the corresponding axiom for the Banzhaf index, in terms of attitudes toward risk involving roles in collective decision procedures under the veil of ignorance (Rawls, 1972 ) with respect to the role to play.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the basic game theoretical background is given along with a summary of our characterization of the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices in Laruelle and Valenciano (1999) . In Section 3 Roth's (1977b) setting and characterization are brie°y reviewed. In Section 4 we translate the axioms reviewed in Section 2 to Roth's setting, where a new characterization is provided. Finally Section 5 concludes with a brief discussion emphasizing the main conclusions of this work and some lines for further research.
SHAPLEY-SHUBIK AND BANZHAF INDICES UP A ZERO AND A UNIT
A cooperative transferable utility (TU) game is a pair (N; v), where N = f1; :::; ng denotes the set of players and v a function which assigns a real number to each non-empty subset or coalition of N, and v(;) = 0. When N is clear from the context, we will refer to game (N; v) as game v. The number of players in a coalition S is denoted s. A game is
whenever S \ T = ;.
A (0-1)-game is a game in which the function v only takes the values 0 and 1. It is a simple game if it is not identically 0; and monotonic. In this context, the superadditivity property is equivalent to the condition: v(S) + v(N n S) · 1 for all S ½ N. Let SG n denote the set of all simple superadditive n-person games. The following de¯nitions refer to games in SG n . A coalition S is said to be winning in game v if v(S) = 1, and is losing if v(S) = 0. A winning coalition is minimal if it does not contain any other. In game v; W (v) (resp., M(v)) will denote the set of winning (resp., minimal winning) coalitions in v. Any of these sets, W (v) or M (v), fully characterizes the game v. A player i is said to be a swinger in a coalition S if S is winning and S n fig is not. A null player in a game v is a player i who is never a swinger, that is, v(S) = v(S n fig) for all S.
As a collective decision-making procedure is speci¯ed by the voting body and the decision rules, it can be modeled by a (0-1)-game whose winning coalitions are those that can make a decision without the vote of the remaining players. We assume that the decision rules are consistent in the following sense. The unanimity of the players can make a decision. Any subgroup of a group of voters that cannot make a decision cannot either. Two nonintersecting groups of voters cannot make decision at the same time.
Under these conditions a voting procedure can be described as a simple superadditive game. Notwithstanding, note that such a voting procedure is fully speci¯ed by the list of winning coalitions, and any assumption concerning the meaning of the numerical 0/1 values of the game is unnecessary and unjusti¯ed. In particular the assumption, common in the TU context, that the value of a coalition S represents the utility that the members of S can distribute among themselves is out of place here.
For any coalition S µ N, the S-unanimity game, denoted (N; u S ), is the simple game
u N , and any S 2 M(v), the modi¯ed game v ¤ S is the game such that W (v ¤ S ) = W (v) n fSg. Avoiding starting from the unanimity game and dropping a minimal winning coalition guarantee that v ¤ S 2 SG n . In terms of decision-making procedures, the modi¯ed game v ¤ S represents the new procedure that results from the modi¯cation of a decision-making rules in such a way that one and only one coalition that previously could make a decision cannot any more.
A power index is a function © : SG n ! R n that associates with each simple superadditive game v a vector or power pro¯le ©(v) whose ith component is interpreted as an a priori measure of the in°uence that player i can exert on the outcome when decisions are to be made according to the decision rule described by v. To evaluate the distribution of power among the players the two best known power indices are the Shapley-Shubik (1954) index and the Banzhaf (1965) index. The Shapley-Shubik index is given by fig)) ; i = 1; :::; n:
The Banzhaf index is given by fig)) ; i = 1; :::; n:
The Shapley-Shubik index was¯rst axiomatized by Dubey (1975) . A similar axiomatization of the Banzhaf index sharing three out of four axioms was given by Dubey and Shapley (1979) .
The main purpose of these or any other measure of power is to allow comparisons of the players' capacity to in°uence the outcome in the same or in di®erent voting procedures.
Moreover, as already pointed out above, the only relevant information in a decision-making procedure is the list of winning coalitions. Therefore a power index should be based on this information, and should not attribute any importance to the particular numerical 0/1 values of the characteristic function used to describe it. These considerations took us to propose in Laruelle and Valenciano (1999) a characterization consistent with this idea.
More precisely, avoiding any normalizing ingredients in our axioms we characterized both indices up to the choice of a zero and a unit. We now summarize our axiomatization,¯rst reviewing our axioms, for we only share anonymity with previous characterizations in the literature.
Anonymity (An): For all v 2 SG n ; any permutation ¼ of N, and any i 2 N,
where (¼v)(S) := v(¼(S)).
This axiom states that the measure of power does not depend on how the players are labeled.
Null Player (NP): For all v 2 SG n , and all i 2 N; i is a null player in v , for all w 2 SG n ;
The axiom states that being a null player is the (strictly, mind the equivalence) worst role any player can play, the role that yields a minimal measure of power.
Transfer (T):
For any v; w 2 SG n ; and all
This axiom, equivalent to the usual transfer, postulates that the e®ect (gain or loss) on any player's power of eliminating a single minimal winning coalition from the set of winning ones is the same in any game in which this coalition is minimal winning. In Laruelle and Valenciano (1999) we also show that this axiom can be replaced in the characterizing theorem by the following weaker (under anonymity) assumption.
Symmetric Gain-Loss (SymGL): For all v 2 SG n , all S 2 M(v) (S 6 = N), and all i; j 2 S (resp., i; j 2 N n S),
The axiom states that the e®ect of eliminating a minimal winning coalition is the same for any two players belonging to it and also for any two players outside it. Finally, our di®erentiating axioms for the Shapley-Shubik and the Banzhaf index are respectively:
Total Gain-Loss Balance (TGLB): For all v 2 SG n and all S 2 M(v) (S 6 = N),
Average Gain-Loss Balance (AGLB): For all v 2 SG n and all
Total (resp., average) gain-loss balance postulates that the total (resp., average) loss of the players in a minimal winning coalition equals the total (resp., average) gain of the players outside it, when this coalition is eliminated from the list of winning coalitions. Now, denoting 1 : = (1; :::; 1) 2 R n ; we have the main result in Laruelle and Valenciano (ii) © satis¯es anonymity, null player, symmetric gain-loss (or transfer) and average gain-loss balance if and only if it is © = ®Bz + ·1, for some ® > 0 and · 2 R.
ROTH'S SETTING AND RESULTS
Let L(SG n £ N) denote the set of lotteries on SG n £ N. That is, the set of distributions of probability on the set SG n £ N 1 . A pair (v; i) in this set is interpreted as the prospect of the event "playing role i in game v". Any power index © : SG n ! R n determines a preference ordering on L(SG n £ N), the one represented by the expected utility function associated to ' : SG n £ N ! R; de¯ned by '(v; i) := © i (v): Any such an ordering will rank all possible roles in all possible games, as well as lotteries on them. This is the setting proposed by Roth (1977b Roth ( , 1988 , in which the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices are reinterpreted as utility functions representing risk preferences. This interpretation implies a point of view beyond that of any particular player. There are no players in fact, just "positions" in games or "roles", hence the more appropriate expression in this context "playing role i in game v". In this setting Roth investigates the attitudes toward risk that underlie and characterize the preferences associated to either index. But before proceeding with Roth's results we need some notation.
A lottery on SG n £N can be represented by a map l : SG n £N ! R; such that (i) for all (v; i) in SG n £ N, l(v; i)¸0, and (ii) P i2N P v2SGn l(v; i) = 1; where l(v; i) is the probability of playing role i in game v.
is,¸l © (1 ¡¸)l 0 can be interpreted as a second order lottery that assigns probabilitiesa nd 1 ¡¸to l and l 0 respectively. Any "convex combination" of lotteries can be de¯ned similarly. With this notation, for instance,
2 (w; j) will denote the lottery that gives one half to playing role i in game v and one half to playing role j in game w: The support of a lottery l is the set sup(l) := f(v; i) 2 SG n £ N s.t. l(v; i) > 0g : Two special kinds of lotteries will play an important role. On the one hand, lotteries in which the game to be played is sure but the role is random. In particular © i2N 1 n (v; i) will denote the lottery that assigns the same probability 1 n to all roles in game v. Also, for any S ½ N, we will write © i2S 1 s (v; i) with obvious similar meaning. On the other hand, lotteries in which the game to be played is random but the role is sure will be used too. Such lotteries can be expressed consistently with the former notation like this © v2SGn l(v; i)(v; i), if role i is sure.
We now formulate Roth's assumptions relative to an ordering ¹ in L(SG n £ N) that permitted him to single out the speci¯c ones associated to Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices. The indi®erence relation associated to ¹ will be denoted "»".
R1: For all (v; i) 2 SG n £ N; any permutation ¼ of N, and any i 2 N,
R2: For all (v; i) 2 SG n £ N; if v 0 denotes the 0-game s.t. v 0 (S) = 0 for all S;
Neutrality to ordinary risk: For all v; w 2 SG n ; and all i 2 N,
Neutrality to strategic risk: For any S µ N; and all i 2 S;
Banzhaf-aversion to strategic risk: For any S µ N; and all i 2 S; Some remarks are worth here. First, note that "R1" corresponds to the traditional "anonymity" in the usual set up, while "neutrality to ordinary risk" is the direct translation of Dubey's transfer axiom. As to condition "R2", that unnecessarily uses the nonsimple zero-game v 0 , is an awkward translation of traditional "null player" including some additional plausible ingredients. The role of the di®erentiating axioms is played by "neutrality to strategic risk" and a form of "aversion to strategic risk". But the translation of these two axioms from the preferences setting back into usual set up is the following. The¯rst one's counterpart would be just assuming that for any S-unanimity game © i (u S ) = 1 s = Sh i (u S ): As to the second, its counterpart would be just assuming that for any S-unanimity game
This is just imposing the "right" value of the index for the unanimity games in either case. In other words, the counterparts of these axioms in the usual set up are rather ad hoc assumptions that would permit to derive directly either index by just assuming, in addition, null player and transfer, so making super°uous anonymity and e±ciency or the corresponding di®erentiating axiom for Banzhaf. Moreover, Roth's interpretation of these axioms on "strategic" grounds, however appealing at¯rst sight, are particularly misleading in his set up. In either case, the condition and its game-theoretic°a vored name, is explained in the following terms. Both axioms postulate the indi®erence between a certain gamble involving playing the dictator role or playing the zero-game, and the sure membership of the unique minimal winning coalition in the S-unanimity game u S . Roth's interpretation is that playing the game u S involves a certain "strategic" 
BEHIND THE VEIL OF IGNORANCE
In our view, the only consistent interpretation of Roth's setting is that what matters is the preference ordering on roles in voting rules when one is uncertain with respect to the role to be played. That is, in the more suitable and suggestive Rawls' (1972) terms, "under the veil of ignorance". It is in these terms that all axioms should be interpreted. Then the following assumptions are the result of translating into the present framework the axioms reviewed in Section 2, used by us in Laruelle and Valenciano (1999) to characterize the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices up to a zero and a unit in SG n : Namely, in what follows all assumptions refer to a preference ordering ¹ on L(SG n £ N) (for we will not use the zero-game). In order to make it clearer this correspondence we use the same names, full or abbreviated, just adding one asterisk. Anonymity* (An*): For all (v; i) 2 SG n £ N; any permutation ¼ of N, and any i 2 N,
where (¼v)(S) := v(¼(S)).
This is just Roth's R1, the only axiom common to his characterization and ours.
Null Player* (NP*): For all (v; i) 2 SG n £ N; i is a null player in v , for all w 2 SG n ; (v; i) ¹ (w; i):
This axiom is the direct translation of our null player (NP): The role of null player is the worst (strictly) that can be attached to any position i.
Transfer* (T*): For any v; w 2 SG n ; all S 2 M(v) \ M(w) (S 6 = N); and all i 2 N
This axiom postulates the indi®erence, whenever the position i is sure and S is a minimal winning coalition of games v and w, between the lottery that gives identical probabilities to play v or w ¤ S and the lottery that gives identical probability to play v ¤ S or w. Note that this axiom, a direct translation of our transfer (T), is equivalent to Roth's (1977b Roth's ( , 1988 ) "neutrality to ordinary risk" though the involved games are simpler.
Observe that for any reasonable preference, if i 2 S (if i 2 N n S the preferences should be reversed); (v; i) Â (v ¤ S ; i) and (w ¤ S ; i) Á (w; i), then the assumption expresses the intensity of these desirability comparisons.
As we will show, also in this framework transfer* can be replaced by the following simpler (and weaker under anonymity*) condition that results from translating our symmetric gain-loss into this setting.
Symmetric Gain-Loss* (SymGL*): For all v 2 SG n , all S 2 M(v) (S 6 = N), and all i; j 2 S (resp., i; j 2 N n S),
The axiom postulates the indi®erence between the lottery that gives identical probability to role i in v and to role j in v ¤ S and the lottery that gives identical probability to role j in v and to role i in v ¤ S , given that both players i and j are either both in the minimal winning coalition S dropped or both outside it. Now, as for any reasonable preference, if i; j 2 S (if i; j 2 N n S the preferences should be reversed); (v; i) Â (v ¤ S ; i) and (v ¤ S ; j) Á (v; j), again the assumption expresses the intensity of these desirabilities.
As an alternative to transfer* or symmetric gain-loss*, the following axiom, that is not the translation of any of the axioms reviewed in Section 2 and is stronger than transfer* as shown in Proposition 1, has a clear and compelling interpretation. Thus, it can either replace or justify any of the two former axioms in the characterizing theorem.
Coalitional Expectations Dependence (CED):
For all l; l 0 2 L(SG n £ N) with sup-
This axiom requires that the ranking of lotteries in which the position is sure depends exclusively on the coalitional expectations of being winning. In other words, two lotteries in which the same position is sure and that assign to each coalition the same probability of being winning should be considered indi®erent. Dubey and Shapley (1979) point out that this property, though they do not state it in general terms, would justify transfer.
Also Roth (1977b) The following propositions establish the relationships between the former axioms.
Proposition 1 Coalitional expectations dependence (CED) implies transfer* (T*).
Proof. Let v; w 2 SG n ; and S 2 M(v) \ M (w) (S 6 = N). Just observe that for all Proof. Let v 2 SG n ; and S 2 M(v) (S 6 = N): First note that for any permutation ¼ of
Now let i; j 2 S; and let ¼ the permutation interchanging i and j.
. By VNM, An* and T*,
The case i; j 2 N n S is entirely similar.
Observe that only through the implied "sustitutivity" the VNM assumption has played a role in the proof of the previous proposition. In Laruelle and Valenciano (1999) an example shows that under anonymity transfer is strictly stronger than symmetric gainloss. The same example can be adapted to show that the converse of Proposition 2 for T* and SymGL* is not true.
Finally the following axioms, interpretable as di®erent forms of indi®erence through the veil of ignorance, are the translations into this setting of our di®erentiating axioms, total and average gain-loss balance.
Absolute Indi®erence under the Veil of Ignorance (AIVI): For all v 2 SG n , and
This axiom postulates the indi®erence between playing v or v ¤ S when all positions are equally probable. In fact, it can be easily seen that it is equivalent to stating the indi®erence of playing any two games when all roles are equally probable. For it, just note that whatever the game v, by dropping minimal winning coalitions one each time the unanimity game u N is¯nally reached. So, by repeatedly applying the axiom it follows that when all roles are equally probable v and u N , and consequently any two games, are indi®erent. This is in fact the natural counterpart of "e±ciency" once stripped of its normalizing ingredients and translated to Roth's setting.
Conditional Indi®erence under the Veil of Ignorance (CIVI): For all v 2 SG n , and all S 2 M(v) (S 6 = N),
This axiom postulates the indi®erence between playing v or v ¤ S when it is equally probable to play a role in S or in N n S, and all roles are equally probable within each of these coalitions. In other words, now it is indi®erent to play v or v ¤ S if the way of assigning the role is the following:¯rst, a coin is tossed to choose S or N n S, then a role is chosen at random in the previously chosen coalition.
To make more clear a comparison between these two di®erent attitudes facing the veil of ignorance, observe that both conditions are particular cases of the following principle:
For all v 2 SG n , and all S 2 M(v) (S 6 = N),
for some collection¸= (¸s) s=1;2::;n¡1 , with¸s 2 (0; 1):
AIVI is the particular case¸s = s n ; while CIVI is the particular case¸s = 1 2 . That is, assuming all roles in S and N n S are equally probable, the indi®erence between v and v ¤ S depends on the way of choosing between S and N n S. Ceteris paribus, from CIVI's point of view what matters is to be or not to be in S. While according to AIVI the size of the coalition matters too. More precisely, according to AIVI it is as if all the advantage of being or not in S or N n S were to be¯nally assigned to only one player in the coalition chosen at random. So that the importance of being in the right coalition has to be inversely weighted by its size.
Before proceeding with the main result, let us see that the former axioms, except coalitional expectations dependence, are one by one the exact translation into Roth's setting of the axioms reviewed in Section 2. (SymGL/SymGL*): Let v 2 SG n , S 2 M(v) (S 6 = N), and i; j 2 S (resp., i; j 2 N n S).
Then the following equivalences are immediate:
(TGLB/AIVI) Let v 2 SG n , and
(AGLB/CIVI) Let v 2 SG n , and S 2 M(v) (S 6 = N),
Now we can state the main result in this paper. The games on both sides of the equality are in Co(SG n ), where Sh i is de¯ned and linear.
Or equivalently P i.e., l » l 0 . Thus ¹ veri¯es CED.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
As a¯rst conclusion of this work we want to emphasize and vindicate Roth's (1977b Roth's ( , 1988 ) approach. We think that Roth's setting is particularly appropriate for a better Apart from this basic coincidence with Roth's (1977b Roth's ( , 1988 ) approach we want to stress some discrepancies. As discussed in Section 3, Roth's interpretation of his di®er-entiating axioms, "neutrality/aversion to strategic risk," is particularly inconsistent with the interpretation of power indices as utility functions representing expected utility preferences on roles in voting rules. On the other hand, the justi¯cation of "e±ciency" of the resulting utility function in this context for the Shapley-Shubik preference ordering remains unavoidably obscure in Roth's (1977b Roth's ( , 1988 . It just appears as an unaccountable consequence of the other axioms. 
